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LINKAGE AND MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE
DAVID M. DRIESEN*
INTRODUCTION
Most analysts assume that a unitary decisionmaker creates and
1
enforces an emissions trading program. This article, however, shows
2
that environmental benefit trading under the Kyoto Protocol
3
depends heavily on a complex multi-jurisdictional architecture. And
it explores some of this architecture’s implications for the ongoing
effort to use an environmental benefit trading approach,
conventionally seen as a property rights approach, to protect the
atmospheric commons.4
This article begins by showing that the Kyoto Protocol does not
create individual property rights at the global level, at least not
directly. Instead, it provides a framework that distributes authority to
create and enforce property rights to international, regional, national,
sub-national, and even private entities.5 Because of this architecture,

Copyright © 2009 by David M. Driesen.
 University Professor, Syracuse University; J.D. Yale Law School, 1989.
1. See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in
Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 701-04 (1999) (discussing various models based on a unitary
decision-maker).
2. Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change: Kyoto
Protocol, adopted Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
3. See Erik B. Bluemel, Unraveling the Global Warming Regime Complex: Competitive
Entropy in the Regulation of the Global Public Good, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1981, 1984 (2007)
[hereinafter Bluemel, Unraveling] (describing a “global warming regime complex” binding
trading regimes together).
4. Cf. David M. Driesen, What’s Property Got to Do With It?, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1003,
1007-10 (2003) (reviewing DANIEL COLE, POLLUTION AND PROPERTY: COMPARING
OWNERSHIP INSTITUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (2002)) (discussing the limits
of property as a metaphor for allowance trading).
5. See Bluemel, Unraveling (initials),supra note 3, at 2015-25 (describing various
subglobal trading regimes as “nested” within the Kyoto Protocol); see also Eva Benz, Andreas
Löschel & Bodo Sturm, Auctioning of CO2 Emission Allowances in Phase 3 of the EU
Emissions Trading Scheme 2-7 (ZEW Centre for Eur. Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 08-
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efforts to create an international market in order to maximize cost
savings and liquidity come not from a global assignment of property
rights, but from efforts by numerous regulators to “link” disparate
regional, national, and sub-national trading programs.
The article’s second part analyzes some of the implications of this
distribution of authority for the linking project. It discusses some
enforcement concerns arising from this architecture that raise
questions about whether Kyoto Protocol style trading is capable of
delivering technology transfer, or instead, simply gives up emission
reductions without obtaining any meaningful additional technology
transfer. This problem has led to some restrictions on free trade of
credits designed to combat what might be broadly described as
emissions fraud.6 The number of actors empowered to create such
rules suggests that the rules addressing the problem will likely
become numerous, varying, and complex.7
The third part of the article reviews some policy options for
addressing the problems of excessive complexity in trading markets.
It argues that recommendations to simply reduce transaction costs are
overly simplistic, as transaction costs are necessary to pay for fraud
detection. Instead, it suggests rethinking the automatic acceptance of
linking and supplementing trading with measures to stimulate needed
innovation.
The article concludes that a property rights regime can
contribute to addressing global warming. But the global trading of
credits does little to spur innovation and puts the realization of a cap
at risk. For this reason, it may be wiser to restrict or even eliminate
linkages between programs with caps and programs offering credits
from uncapped sectors, such as the Clean Development Mechanism.
I.

KYOTO’S MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE

In the past, many international agreements have limited the
pollution coming from the countries involved without specifying the

081, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1298952 (describing the initial allocation rules
implanted under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme).
6. I use this term to describe any case in which an emission reduction claim leads to a loss
of a planned emission reduction without an additional, real, and correctly quantified extra
emission reduction to make up for it, not just to describe intentionally false claims.
7. Cf. Judson Jaffe & Robert N. Stavins, Linkage of Tradable Permit Systems in
International Climate Policy Architecture, 15-19 (Harvard Project on Int’l Climate Agreements,
Discussion Paper 08-07, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1285606 (providing an
overview of linkage).
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mechanisms for limiting pollution.8 It would be possible to craft a
climate change agreement that established reduction targets for
national governments, but said nothing about how they should
achieve these targets.9 Such an approach would leave countries quite
free to choose between traditional regulation, emissions trading,
pollution taxes, and even voluntary approaches, as long as the
countries met their internationally agreed upon goals.10
The parties to the Kyoto Protocol, however, decided to address
the instrument choice issue in the international agreement itself,
rather than only on the national level.11 As a result, the Kyoto
Protocol authorizes no less than three emissions trading programs,
allowing developed countries to purchase credits from developing
countries through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), from
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union through the Joint
Implementation Program (JI), and from other developed countries
with reduction obligations under the Kyoto Protocol.12 The big
advantage of this global approach, however fragmented, is that it
allows for global trading of emission reduction credits.13 The large
market thus created will tend to produce greater cost savings than a
14
smaller market would have. At the same time, the use of
international trading greatly increases the complexity of institutional
challenges facing governments implementing the trading programs,
which creates risks of lost emission reductions.
The Kyoto Protocol itself does not operationalize any trading
program. It simply creates a framework for these programs which
come to life if nation states (or other subglobal entities) implement

8. See David M. Driesen, Choosing Environmental Instruments in a Transnational
Context, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 18-19 (2000) [hereinafter Driesen, Choosing Environmental
Instruments] (discussing treaties, including the Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting
Substances, that do not specify implementation mechanisms).
9. Id. at 18 (discussing a “pluralism option” under which national governments choose
instruments independently).
10. See generally Alan S. Miller, Policy Responses to Global Warming, 14 S. ILL. U. L.J. 187
(1990) (reviewing possible national responses to global warming).
11. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, arts. 6, 12, 17.
12. Id.; Maria Netto & Kai-Uwe Barani Schmidt, CDM Project and the Role of the
UNFCCC Secretariat, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
MECHANISMS: MAKING KYOTO WORK 175, 175 (David Freestone & Charlotte Streck eds.,
2005) [hereinafter KYOTO MECHANISMS].
13. Cf. Harro Van Asselt, Francesco Sindico & Michael A. Mehling, Global Climate
Change and the Fragmentation of International Law, 30 LAW & POL'Y 423, 432 (2008)
(discussing vertical fragmentation in international law as an influence on emissions trading).
14. See Wiener, supra note 1, at 717.
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them. The Kyoto Protocol shares this dependence upon national
implementation with substantially all international environmental
agreements because there is no international bureaucracy capable of
regulating private conduct directly.15 Since most environmental harms
stem from private production and consumption decisions, some subglobal governmental units must enact regulatory programs in order to
implement
international
agreements
aimed
at
reducing
16
environmental hazards.
The European Union (EU) assumed a leadership role in
coordinating Europe’s implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, while
still leaving many substantial decisions to member states. Thus, the
EU as a whole, not each member state, chose to implement an
emissions trading program and determined which industries would be
17
subject to emission limits. This choice reflected the global decision
embodied in the Kyoto Protocol to favor trading. While the Kyoto
Protocol did not require countries to use trading, its support for
trading no doubt influenced the EU decision to adopt it.18
While the EU as a whole made some important trading design
decisions, it left the most important decision of all, the amount of
reductions to require from facilities in its emissions trading scheme
19
(ETS), largely to member states. Yet, the ETS does provide for
European Commission review of the National Allocation Programs
(NAPs) that establish the caps and criteria under which the European
Commission may disapprove of insufficiently ambitious NAPs, which
the Commission has exercised.20 The decision to leave critical
15. See generally ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson eds.,
1998) (discussing national compliance efforts).
16. See Driesen, Choosing Environmental Instruments, supra note 8, at 6, 15-16 (developing
a transnational legal process model explaining how international agreements become translated
into domestic law generating compliance).
17. See Council Directive 2003/87/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 275). See generally Bent Ole Gram
Mortensen, The EU Emission Trading Directive, 13 EUR. ENVTL. L. REV. 275 (2004) (discussing
the directive and how it helps the European Union meet Kyoto Protocol objectives); Rie
Watanabe & Guy Robinson, The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, 5 CLIMATE
POL’Y 10 (2005) (explaining the scheme’s particulars).
18. See Chad Damro & Pilar Luaces Méndez, Emissions Trading at Kyoto: From EU
Resistance to Union Innovation, 12 ENVTL. POL. 71, 74 (2003) (arguing that EU emissions
trading “stems from” a “policy transfer” process emanating from the Kyoto Protocol
negotiations).
19. See Marisa Martin, Trade Law Implications of Restricting Participation in the European
Union Emissions Trading Scheme, 19 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 437, 443-44 (2007).
20. For a discussion of the European Commission review of NAPs and the litigation it
spawned, see, e.g. Sharon Long & Giedre Kaminskaite-Salters, The EU-ETS—Latest
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decisions about the stringency of caps primarily to member states left
those states vulnerable to lobbying based on competitiveness
21
concerns. This vulnerability contributed to weakness in the NAPs,
especially with respect to highly competitive energy intensive
22
industries. The European Commission has recognized this problem
and is considering having the EU set the cap for a third phase of
trading envisioned after 2012.23
Because the EU ETS links up with the “project-based
mechanisms” (the CDM and JI programs that garner credits from
individual projects), the integrity of the scheme depends upon
effective oversight of claims of environmental benefits realized
around the world.24 The Kyoto Protocol has spawned a complex
multi-level governance structure seeking to assure the integrity of
credits said to reflect fresh efforts to address global warming.
At the international level, the Kyoto Protocol has created
subsidiary bodies to exercise oversight and provide expert advice. The
most prominent of these bodies, the CDM Executive Board, approves
methodologies for estimating emission reductions from various types
25
of projects. Since this body cannot itself verify emission reductions
on the ground in the developing countries where developers carry out
CDM projects, Kyoto’s architecture relies on national governments
and private entity enforcement of the Kyoto Protocol as well. The
Kyoto Protocol delegates decisions about whether projects contribute
Developments and the Way Forward, 1 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 64, 66-68 (2007); Leonard
Massai, Current Developments: European Union, 2 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 112, 117
(2008). See also Ved P. Nanda, The European Union’s Multinational Carbon Trading Program,
85 DENV. U. L. REV. 995, 1001-02 (summarizing the Directive requiring the development of
NAPs).
21. Axel Michaelowa & Sonja Butzengeiger, EU Emissions Trading: Navigating Between
Scylla and Charybdis, 5 CLIMATE POL’Y 1, 5 (2005) (explaining how lobbying in the EU led to
goals little different from “business-as-usual” levels in phase I of the EU trading scheme).
22. See id. See generally NATIONAL ALLOCATION PLANS IN THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING
SCHEME: LESSONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PHASE II (Michael Grubb, Regina Betz & Karsten
Neuhoff eds., 2006) (discussing weakness in the NAPs and reasons for them).
23. Benjamin Görlach, Hauke Hermann & Olaf Hölzer-Schopohl, In the Market: The
European Emissions Trading Scheme—Coming of Age? An Assessment of the EU Commission
Proposal for a Review of the Scheme, 2 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 105, 106 (2008).
24. See ANJA KOLLMUSS ET AL., A REVIEW OF OFFSET PROGRAMS: TRADING SYSTEMS,
FUNDS, PROTOCOLS, STANDARDS AND RETAILERS 6 (Stockholm Envtl. Inst.,Version 1.1, 2008)
(describing the EU ETS as a major driver for the global offset market); Council Directive
2004/101/EC, pmbl. (2), 2004 O.J. (L 338) 18 [hereinafter Linking Directive].
25. See Ernestine Meijer & Jacob Werksman, Keeping it Clean—Safeguarding the
Environmental Integrity of the Clean Development Mechanism, in KYOTO MECHANISMS, supra
note 12, at 192, 197, 202 (discussing the CDM Executive Board’s role of reviewing a project’s
environmental integrity).
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to “sustainable development” to host country governments, which
may disapprove of projects, but these governments, with the notable
26
exception of China, have rarely exercised serious oversight. Since
developing countries often lack the capacity to monitor and verify
emission reductions, the Kyoto Protocol privatizes that function,
allowing “designated operational entities” to verify emission
reductions.27 The CDM Executive Board must approve these
28
entities. In practice though, these entities are usually consultant
firms hired by the project developer.29 This means that conflicts of
interest threaten the system’s integrity.30
Because the United States’ federal government has not
implemented the Kyoto Protocol, subnational governmental bodies
took the lead in addressing climate change, including the initiation of
emissions trading programs.31 The first program, the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), consists of an agreement of
governors of the northeastern states to require emission reductions
from their electric utilities and allow trading to reduce the cost of
these reductions.32 This agreement not only offers an example of
26. See Michael Wara, Measuring the Clean Development Mechanism’s Performance and
Potential, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1759, 1773 & n.77 (2008) (noting that countries have not
disapproved CERs, but citing a Chinese Law using differential taxation to encourage its
preferred types of CDM projects).
27. See Meijer & Werksman, supra note 25, at 198-202 (describing the role of Designated
Operational Entities).
28. Id.
29. See Wara, supra note 26, at 1799 (discussing possible reforms, including to the CDM
structure, to deal with conflict of interest for consultant firms hired by project developers).
30. See Michael W. Wara & David G. Victor, A Realistic Policy on International Carbon
Offsets 19 (Program on Energy and Sustainable Dev., Working Paper No. 74, 2008), available at
http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22157/WP74_final_final.pdf; see also Jelmer Hoogzaad, Adriann
Korthuis & Charlotte Streck, A Call to Reform, CARBON FIN., Oct. 2008, at 16, 16 (describing
designating operating authorities’ incompetence).
31. See Erik B. Bluemel, Regional Regulatory Initiatives Addressing GHG Leakage in the
USA, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND EUROPEAN EMISSIONS TRADING: LESSONS FOR THEORY AND
PRACTICE 225, 225 (Michael Faure & Marjan Peeters eds., 2008); David M. Driesen, The
Changing Climate for United States Law, 1 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 33, 36-41 (2007);
Kirsten H. Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United States: A Regional Approach,
14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 54, 54 (2005); Douglas A. Kysar & Bernadette A. Meyler, Like a Nation
State, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1621, 1628-32 (2008); see generally BARRY RABE, STATEHOUSE AND
GREENHOUSE: THE EMERGING POLITICS OF AMERICAN CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY (2004)
(discussing state programs addressing greenhouse gas emissions).
32. See REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
(2005) [hereinafter MOU], available at http://rggi.org/docs/mou_final_12_20_05.pdf; Note, The
Compact Clause and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1958, 1959-60
(2007) (describing the political process establishing RGGI). Currently, these states are
Maryland, Delaware, New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
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regional governance within a nation state; it also embodies multilevel
governance within the sub-national region. The agreement creates a
“Regional Organization” to perform central coordinating tasks, such
as auctioning allowances.33 Furthermore, the regional agreement
resolves very important issues, such as the amount of reductions
34
required, on the regional level. But it leaves many important
decisions, (e.g. how to use revenue realized from the auction) to
states within the region. California and other states also are currently
moving toward implementing emissions trading schemes.35 Whether
ultimately successful or not, international environmental benefit
trading under the Kyoto Protocol has spawned a complex
architecture, with responsibilities shared among global international
bodies (e.g. CDM Executive Board), regional international bodies
(e.g. EU Commission), national governments, subnational entities
(e.g. state governments within the U.S.) and private entities.
36
Of course, all of this leads to coordination difficulties. The
European Commission has been in contact with California and RGGI
37
staff to discuss coordination issues. When the United States federal
government enacts an emissions trading program, it will face an issue
of how to coordinate its effort with the state programs already
underway in the northeast and west. The EU has already faced a
similar issue arising from an early emissions trading program in the
United Kingdom, which predated the EU ETS.38

Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Inc.,
http://rggi.org/states (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
33. MOU, supra note 32, § 4.
34. Id. § 2(c).
35. See generally MARKET ADVISORY COMM. TO THE CAL. AIR RES. BD.,
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DESIGNING A GREENHOUSE GAS CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEM FOR
CALIFORNIA (2007); Western Climate Initiative, http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org (last
visited Mar. 24, 2009); MIDWESTERN ENERGY SECURITY & CLIMATE STEWARDSHIP SUMMIT,
MIDWESTERN
GREENHOUSE
GAS
ACCORD
(Nov.
15,
2007),
available
at
http://www.wisgov.state.wi.us/docview.asp?docid=12497.
36. To have an international market, regulators must be willing to accept credits from
other markets. Some will only be willing to do so if they are convinced that the rules governing
credit generation outside their jurisdiction are sufficiently stringent to make the credits
acceptable. Thus regulators will want to negotiate common rules, which will require complex
compromises. Also, there is grave doubt about whether credits generated in the United States
can be used to satisfy Kyoto obligations, because the U.S. is not a party to the Kyoto Protocol.
37. See Kysar & Meyler, supra note 31, at 1637 (discussing the coordination efforts of the
European Union countries, U.S. states, and Canadian provinces under the International Carbon
Action Partnership).
38. See Bluemel, Unraveling, supra note 3, at 2021-24 (discussing the British program and
the EU effort to bring it into harmony with the ETS).
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Because the Kyoto Protocol itself does not create or enforce
individual property rights, efforts to establish an international market
depend on a project of linking various national and regional markets.
On the whole, regulators embrace this linking of markets, as they
recognize that a broad market can deliver more cost savings than a
smaller one.39 But they have some concerns about environmental
integrity that lead them to exercise some caution in ways which
40
complicate linkage.
II. MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE’S IMPLICATIONS
A single government actor can establish and enforce a cap on the
41
emissions of facilities within its jurisdiction. Establishing and
enforcing a cap creates environmental benefits. Allowing capped
sources to forego local reductions if they purchase credits from
outside the jurisdiction does not generally add environmental benefits
beyond those achievable through local compliance with the cap, but it
does allow for cost savings.42 Unfortunately, the cost savings can
either reflect evasion of pollution control obligations or simply
control cost differentials between states.43 Regulators must sort out
the difference in a multi-level governance context.
A. Technology Transfer
The CDM aims to promote sustainable development.44 While the
sustainable development concept, like other broad concepts
(democracy, free trade, liberalism) suffers from significant
ambiguities, experts involved in trading under the Kyoto Protocol
clearly associate it with a hope for clean technological development in
39. Kysar & Meyler, supra note 31, at 1634 (discussing efficiency increases with larger
number of firms and sectors).
40. See KOLLMUSS ET AL., supra note 24, at 1 (describing offset environmental integrity
risk as “widely apparent”).
41. See, e.g., Brennan Van Dyke, Emissions Trading to Reduce Acid Deposition, 100 YALE
L.J. 2707 (1991) (discussing the EPA run acid rain program).
42. See David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?:
Replacing the Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
289, 324-27 (1998) [hereinafter Driesen, Emissions Trading] (explaining that trading provides no
incentives for net reductions beyond those required by the cap).
43. See David M. Driesen, Free Lunch or Cheap Fix?: The Emissions Trading Idea and the
Climate Change Convention, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 40, 86 (1998) [hereinafter Driesen,
Free Lunch] (explaining that substantial cost savings can come from double counting credits,
claiming credits for activities that do not reduce emissions, or claiming credits for projects that
would have been undertaken without trading).
44. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, art. 12.
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poorer countries.45 Thus, CDM proponents see it as a means
promoting technology transfer to developing countries. Such
technology transfer could increase developing countries technical
capabilities, which could contribute both to economic development
and to their willingness and ability to limit their own greenhouse gas
emissions in the future. Limiting developing country emissions is
critical to global climate change policy, as the principle host countries
for CDM (notably including China and India) have large and rapidly
rising emissions that threaten to upset ongoing efforts to limit global
warming.
Brokers involved in environmental benefit trading tend to see
the large volume of money flowing into the CDM market as proof
that the CDM is working, but unfortunately meaningful technology
transfer depends on variables other than the mere volume of financial
flows. Large financial flows can signify either technology transfer or
massive emission credit frauds, where money is being paid for paper
credits reflecting no real additional emission reduction.46 The world
has recently witnessed some of the problems that can occur where
large volumes of assets are traded, but regulators fail to require
generation of adequate information about the underlying value of the
assets. In the environmental context, poorly regulated markets not
only risk financial instability, but also loss of progress in solving the
environmental problems that the governments created markets to
address.
Even where real money is buying real emission reductions, the
reductions can be realized either through meaningful transfer of
technologies new to the country, or simply financing of projects that
do not augment a country’s technological capacity. The latter are
perfectly good ways of realizing emission reductions, but do little to
create the positive spillovers that can add value and contribute to

45. See David M. Driesen, What is Free Trade?: The Real Issue Lurking Behind the Trade
and Environment Debate, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 279, 287-312 (2001) (discussing competing
conceptions of free trade based on laissez-faire, non-discrimination, and anti-coercion
principles); David Takacs, Carbon into Gold: Forest Carbon Offsets, Climate Change
Adaptation, and International Law, 15 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 39, 52-54
(discussing UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol references to sustainable development in developing
countries).
46. See Takacs, supra note 45, at 52-54 (noting that private actors generated $30 billion
worth of CDM projects in 2006, but that in many cases these actors were able to evade real
reductions in emissions).
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increased

B. Credit Quality and Design
Sophisticated designers of emissions trading programs appreciate
a significant difference between credits in an environmental trading
market and transactions of other types of goods and services. For
many types of goods and services, markets can often function
reasonably well with relatively little government oversight. The
fundamental reason for this is that buyers care about getting what
they pay for. Accordingly, makers of blue jeans who want to stay in
business must make blue jeans that do not wear out too quickly, or
they may find that no buyers purchase their jeans. Private purchasers
of emission reduction credits, however, may not care about the
quality of environmental benefit credits, unless public oversight
makes them care.48 They do not usually purchase these credits to
realize some benefit for themselves, rather they purchase them in
order to justify not implementing otherwise required emission
reductions.49 If the government will accept the credits purchased in
lieu of the local emission reductions, the buyer gets what it paid for,
50
even if no reduction occurred to justify the sale of credits.
The buyer will only care about the quality of the credits to the extent
that poor quality may lead governments not to accept them in lieu of
local compliance. Sophisticated regulators recognize this, which
explains why a complex set of rules has emerged to check the quality
of credits.
While most scholars refer to Kyoto style trading as a cap and
trade program, linkage to CDM and JI programs creates the
possibility of realizing credits from sources with uncapped emissions,
which gives rise to serious problems. The U.S. acid rain program,
probably the only environmentally successful trading program ever
carried out in the U.S., used a pure cap and trade model, where all

47. See David M. Driesen, Sustainable Development and Market Liberalism’s Shotgun
Wedding: Emissions Trading Under the Kyoto Protocol, 83 IND. L.J. 21, 47-49 (2008) [hereinafter
Driesen, Sustainable Development] (explaining the value of positive spillovers in the Kyoto
context). See generally Brett M. Frischman & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
257, 258-61 (2007) (explaining the spillover concept).
48. Driesen, Free Lunch, supra note 43, at 66 (pointing out that if a genuine desire for
environmental quality motivated credit purchases then voluntary programs would suffice).
49. Id.
50. Id.
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sources of credits were regulated under a strict well-monitored cap.51
By contrast, bubble programs that preceded the acid rain program
allowed sources that did not have emission caps to generate credits,
and various kinds of emissions fraud riddled these programs.52 While
a full account of all the types of mischief trading with uncapped
sources can lead to would require a separate article devoted to this
topic, a review of some of the chief problems that have arisen under
the Kyoto Protocol merits some treatment.
C. Additionality
Emission reduction losses arise when projects lack
“additionality” – when credit is awarded for projects that would have
reduced emissions even if no polluter had paid for the credit.53 In that
case the funds given the project developer do not create an additional

51. See Driesen, Emissions Trading, supra note 42, at 311-22 (reviewing various programs,
including the superior acid rain program); Justin Kirk, Note, Creating an Emissions Trading
System for Greenhouse Gases: Recommendations to the California Air Resources Board, 26 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 547, 558 (2008) (noting that California’s RECLAIM program, a cap and trade
program dealing with urban smog, “is generally viewed as a failure”); Nancy Kete, The U.S.
Acid Rain Control Allowance Trading System, in CLIMATE CHANGE: DESIGNING A TRADABLE
PERMIT SYSTEM 78 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. ed., 1992) (explaining the acid rain
program with its cap); Van Dyke, supra note 41 (explaining the acid rain program with its cap).
While the lead trading program ultimately achieved its goal, enforcement problems riddled the
program. See RES., COMTY., & ECON. DEV. DIV., U.S. GAO, VEHICLE EMISSIONS: EPA
PROGRAM TO ASSIST LEADED-GASOLINE PRODUCERS NEEDS PROMPT IMPROVEMENT 3-4, 1819, 23-24 (1986) (discussing widespread non-compliance and under-enforcement). Robert W.
Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons from Theory and Practice, 16
ECOLOGY L.Q. 361, 388 n.146 (1989). The ozone depletion program, usually cited as an example
of a trading program, produced no trades, but was environmentally successful. See EDWARD A.
PARSON, PROTECTING THE OZONE LAYER: SCIENCE AND STRATEGY 4 (2003) (describing the
ozone regime as the “most conspicuous success yet achieved in protecting . . . the global
environment”); David M. Driesen, Economic Instruments for Sustainable Development, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR SUSTAINABILITY: A CRITICAL READER 277, 282 (Stepan Wood,
Benjamin J. Richardson eds., Hart Publications 2006) (explaining that “little or no trading”
occurred under the Montreal Protocol).
52. See CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD AND UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, PHASE III RULE EFFECTIVENESS STUDY OF THE AEROSPACE COATING
INDUSTRY 4 (1990) (finding that almost all large sources operating under a bubble are not
achieving required reductions); RICHARD A. LIROFF, AIR POLLUTION OFFSETS: TRADING,
SELLING, AND BANKING 22 (1980) (explaining that offsets can be a “meaningless paper game”);
RICHARD A. LIROFF, REFORMING AIR POLLUTION REGULATION: THE TOIL AND TROUBLE
OF EPA’S BUBBLE 62-67, 89-91 (1986) (providing examples of various bubble programs and
noting their flaws); David Doniger, The Dark Side of the Bubble, ENVTL. F., July 1985, 33, 34-35
(discussing bubble’s environmental integrity problems).
53. See generally Sandra Greiner & Axel Michaelowa, Defining Investment Additionality
for CDM Projects—Practical Approaches, 31 ENERGY POL’Y 1007 (2003) (discussing the
additionality concept and some of the difficulties in implementing it).
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emission reduction, but the credits purchased (reflecting reductions
from an already planned and financed project or an emission reducing
happenstance, such as a plant closure) justify allowing the purchaser
to forego an otherwise required reduction.54 Accordingly, the Kyoto
Protocol requires that projects generating credits be “additional to
55
any that would occur in the absence of the certified project activity.”
Designing rules that separate additional from non-additional
credits has proven difficult. The concept requires comparing an actual
project carried out to some hypothetical baseline of what the world
would have looked like without credit revenue flowing to the
56
project. There is some evidence that the CDM Executive Board has
approved numerous projects that are not additional. 57 In one case, it
approved a wind energy project for credit, even though the financing
was in place long before the possibility of CDM credits existed.58
Unfortunately, when a tiny portion of the money paid for credits
reaches those developing the wind project, the project developers can
claim that the money was essential to the project’s completion.59
These claims should be regarded as correct when the money earned
for the credits account for a very high percentage of the project cost,
but appear dubious when the credit revenue accounts for a very low
percentage of the project cost, which has often been the case.
Renewable energy presents a political problem for the CDM
Executive Board. If the CMD Executive Board applied a strict
additionality test to relatively expensive projects like many renewable
energy projects, it is possible that no renewables projects would
54. See Jacob D. Werksman, The “Legitimate Expectations” of Investors and the CDM:
Balancing Public Goods and Private Rights Under the Climate Change Regime, 2 CARBON &
CLIMATE L. REV. 95, 97 (2008).
55. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, art. 12.5(c).
56. See Axel Michaelowa, Determination of Baselines and Additionality for the CDM: A
Crucial Element of Credibility of the Climate Regime, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND CARBON
MARKETS: A HANDBOOK OF EMISSION REDUCTION METHODS 289, 289 (F. Yamin ed. 2005).
57. See LAMBERT SCHNEIDER, OKO-INSTITUTE, IS THE CDM FULFILLING ITS
ENVIRONMENTAL AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES? AN EVALUATION OF THE
CDM AND OPTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 42 (Nov. 5, 2007) (showing that CER revenue was a
very small part of the projected internal rate of return for 546 of the first 803 projects); Wara,
supra note 26, at 1790-97 (showing why it is likely that Chinese power plant projects provide
non-additional credits); Larry Lohman, Toward a Different Debate in Environmental
Accounting: The Cases of Carbon and Cost-Benefit, 34 ACCT. ORG. & SOC’Y (forthcoming
2009).
58. See CDM BD., PROJECT 0315, 125 WIND POWER PROJECT IN KARNATAKA, INDIA 34
(July 1, 2004), http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/DB/DNV-CUK1142448670.58/view (Project 0315).
59. See, e.g., id. at 28 (claiming additionality when a project already generated a 7.36%
return on investment without CDM, and only 7.87% with CDM).
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generate credits.60 If the board disapproves of credits when credit
purchases account for a small portion of project revenue, there is a
good chance that the project will be built without credit, and
therefore without an increase in emissions in the country purchasing
the credits. Thus, denial of credits will not cause a loss of renewable
energy or other environmental benefit; instead it would produce two
reductions, the one required by the cap in Europe and the reductions
by the project not allowed to generate credits that was adequately
financed without CDM. Under the CDM Executive Board’s current
approach, we often give up reductions in Europe because of
reductions elsewhere that would have occurred even if there had been
no credit purchased.
While additionality problems can arise when projects are too
expensive to be funded solely with credit purchases, these problems
can sometimes arise when reductions are so cheap that credit
payments become a significant source of revenue for those running
facilities. Most of the CDM credits generated so far arise not from
renewable energy projects, which can have long-term value for
addressing climate change, but rather from control of industrial
61
gases. The most widely controlled industrial gas, HFC-23, is a potent
greenhouse gas emitted as a byproduct of producing ozone depleting
62
an ozone depleting refrigerant (HCFC-22). Payments for credits
generated from HFC-23 control exceed the value of the refrigerant
being produced. As a result, the carbon market, ironically, creates an
incentive to increase production of an ozone depleting chemical in
order to realize credits from control of the HFC-23 byproduct.63 Since
the market for the refrigerant alone probably would not justify a
production increase, one can say that credits generated by increased
production (e.g. at new facilities) is not additional.

60. See SCHNEIDER, supra note 57, at 42 (showing that CER revenue was generally a very
small part of the projected internal rate of return for renewable energy projects).
61. See KARAN CAPOOR & PHILIPPE AMBROSI, STATE AND TRENDS OF THE CARBON
MARKET 36 (2008), http://wbcarbonfinance.org/docs/State_Trends_FINAL.pdf (noting a
decline in industrial gas projects from their peak in 2005); Wara, supra note 26, at 1778-81; see
also Driesen, Free Lunch, supra note 43, at 46 (pointing out that geographically broad trading
would facilitate avoidance of investment in renewable energy by offering cheaper opportunities
for conventional approaches).
62. See Wara, supra note 26, at 1778-79. HCFC-22 also serves as the primary feedstock in
producing Teflon.
63. See id. at 1783-85.
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III. POLICY RESPONSES
Problems like these concern thoughtful regulators. They enact
environmental benefit trading program in order to realize greenhouse
gas emission reductions. But without effective policing, trades can
end up giving away, rather than just reducing the cost of, emission
reductions.
A. Rule Proliferation
Accordingly, problems like these have led, and will continue to
lead, to a variety of rules and other trading restrictions coming from
the various governments who are responsible for the efficacy of the
trading programs. For example, the CDM Executive Board has
enacted a rule forbidding the acceptance of credits from new HFC-23
emitting facilities to address the problem of carbon markets spawning
new emission sources.64 More broadly, different governments have
defined “additionality” in different ways.
Policing the technical adequacy of individual trades in the
absence of caps and effective monitoring proves extraordinarily
difficult. Indeed, no government has done this reasonably well once
trading outside a cap is allowed.65 We have seen that the CDM
executive board, with private contractors’ assistance, examines
66
individual trades. But it is not the only entity involved in this. The
board implementing the Joint Implementation Program performs a
similar function for that program.67 The Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative requires RGGI states, with guidance from its regional
operating authority, to perform a similar role for offset credits, credits
generated by uncapped sources.68
Another approach to ensuring environmental integrity, or at
least limiting the damage from a lack thereof, is to quantitatively
restrict trade in credits. In fact, this approach is built into the Kyoto
regime. For the Marrakech Accords require that trading credits be

64. Id. at 1785.
65. See Driesen, Emissions Trading, supra note 42, at 311-22 (reviewing the history of
emissions trading programs).
66. See supra notes 24, 26-28 and accompanying text.
67. Andrew Schatz, Note, Discounting the Clean Development Mechanism, 20 GEO. INT’L
ENVTL. L. REV. 703, 713 (2008) (explaining that the Joint Implementation Oversight Committee
oversees “track two” JI projects).
68. See MOU, supra note 32, §§ 2(F), 4(A)(3)-(5).

DRIESEN_FMT2.DOC

2009]

4/27/2009 4:00:04 PM

LINKAGE AND MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE

403

“supplemental” to domestic actions.69 Recent European Commission
guidance has given this principle some minimal meaning, by generally
limiting project-based credits to 50% of member states’ emission
reduction obligations.70
The RGGI program, however, does include rules limiting the
percentage of reductions that utilities subject to the RGGI can realize
by purchasing offset credits, reductions from sources not covered by
RGGI’s cap, in order to protect environmental integrity.71
Furthermore, in recognition of the difficulties of reliably evaluating
project integrity outside the regulator’s jurisdiction, the RGGI
program imposes more stringent quantitative limits on credits
generated outside the northeast than on credits generated within it.72
Some proposed legislation in the U.S. Congress likewise includes
authority to quantitatively limit the use of offset credits.73
Thus, concerns about environmental integrity lead numerous
levels of government to enact rules and conduct review processes to
make sure that trading contributes to, rather than undermines, efforts
to achieve planned emission reductions. This rule proliferation holds
out the promise of protecting against emission losses, but can limit
trading’s ability to lower the costs of protecting the global commons.
B. Coordination
The effort to link markets will raise questions about reconciling
the emerging body of rules. Should all countries accept all credits
allowed by international law, regardless of their quality? Allowing
this could cause an enormous loss of emission reductions, as the rules
appear to allow acceptance of “hot air” credits reflecting declines in
emissions in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, which
69. See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the
Parties on Its Seventh Session, Marrakesh, Morocco, Oct. 29, 2001-Nov. 10, 2001,
Addendum, Guidelines for the Preparation of the Information Required Under Article 7 of the
Kyoto Protocol, ¶21, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.3 (Jan. 21, 2002), available at http://
unfccc.int/resource/ docs/cop7/13a03.pdf.
70. See J. de Sépibus, Linking the EU Emissions Trading Scheme to JI, CDM and post-2012
International Offsets 7-8 (Swiss Nat’l Centre of Competence in Research, Working Paper No.
2008/18, 2008); see also Parliament Baffles with EU ETS Offset Rules, CARBON FIN., Oct. 2008,
at 9, 9 (discussing proposals for quantitative restrictions in CDM credits before the European
Parliament).
71. See MOU, supra note 32, § 2(F)(2)(b).
72. See id. § 2(F)(2)(a)(1)-(2).
73. See KOLLMUSS ET AL., supra note 24, at 5 (pointing out that the Climate Security Act
proposes allowing domestic offsets to equal 15% of the overall emissions cap and international
offsets to equal an additional 15%).
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could, in principle, justify doing nothing to change energy
74
consumption and production habits. While this possibility may
appear academic in light of the lack of such trades so far and
economic modeling showing why the former Soviet Union may
benefit from withholding credits from the market, the current
economic collapse may spread the availability of such credits and
looming compliance deadlines may make such credits attractive to
countries that are not on track to achieve Kyoto targets (unless, of
course, economic collapse brings European domestic emissions down
to the point where serious compliance difficulties disappear).75
Efforts to harmonize rules will create familiar concerns about
races to the bottom. Analysts differ as to whether they view the
potential for a race to the bottom as a significant problem.76 To the
extent that different governments attempt harmonization, the
difficulties of accomplishing it may create uncertainties about the
future content of rules that can discourage trading. As governments
will want to change their rules often, because of changes in
governmental philosophy, new evidence of fraud, and pressure from
interests wanting more liberal trade in credits (such as brokers). So,
harmonization will not be a one-time event, but an ongoing uncertain
and confusing process. These uncertainties can discourage
investments that might otherwise be helpful in addressing global
warming, as they will make it hard to know what the rules are and to
predict their future content. It is hard enough to predict what an
individual government will do in the future, but predicting the actions
of multiple governments acting partly on their own and partly in

74. See Driesen, Free Lunch, supra note 43, at 60-61 (explaining how “hot air” credits can
eliminate progress in developed countries with reduction commitments).
75. See, e.g., Gernot Klepper & Sonja Peterson, Trading Hot-Air: The Influence of Permit
Allocation Rules, Market Power, and the US Withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, 32 ENVTL. &
RESOURCE ECON. 205, 224-26 (2005) (predicting that countries will sell more hot air after
adopting welfare maximizing strategies instead of revenue maximizing strategies). Cf. Christoph
Boringer, Ulf Moslener & Bodo Sturm, Hot Air for Sale: A Quantitative Assessment of Russia’s
Near-Term Climate Policy Options, 38 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 545, 558 (2007) (explaining
that Russia may have incentives to join the international trading market).
76. See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and
Is It “To the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271, 278 (1997) (claiming that state regulators compete
for business by lowering standards); Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental
Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 555-59 (2001) (disputing various
claims about the superiority of centralized regulation); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating
Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal
Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1233-44 (1992).

DRIESEN_FMT2.DOC

2009]

4/27/2009 4:00:04 PM

LINKAGE AND MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE

405

response to political pressures for harmony will prove even harder to
77
predict.
Absent harmonization, trading may focus on the polities with the
78
least demanding environmental standards. Unless the international
rules providing the minimum standards are sufficiently strict (and so
far the evidence suggests they are not), this shift of trading activity to
poorly regulated jurisdictions can undermine the environmental
achievement otherwise realizable through achieving a cap.
C. Transaction Costs
Many U.S. law and economics scholars would probably respond
to this by simply insisting that the goal must be to minimize
transaction costs.79 And this response does have some appeal to it;
after all, rule proliferation may discourage trades and the cost savings
they produce.
Yet, this response proves too glib. As I’ve argued elsewhere, if
minimizing transaction costs means reducing the costs private parties
incur in making trades as much as possible, this is a poor policy
80
recommendation. Governments impose transaction costs on parties
engaged in trading, such as monitoring and reporting obligations, in
order to make it possible to see to it that the benefits associated with
an emission reduction claim actually exist.81 Government must impose
such costs in any environmental law system in order to make it
enforceable. Insisting on the virtual elimination of transaction costs is
tantamount to a demand not to take programs’ environmental goals
seriously, substituting the goal of maximizing trading volume for the
goal of minimizing the costs of delivering the benefit planned for in

77. See, e.g., CDM Approval Now ‘Impossible to Predict’, CARBON FIN., Oct. 2008, at 5, 5
(discussing a carbon fund manager’s complaint that CDM executive board is not predictable,
since the rules change almost daily).
78. See Bluemel, Unraveling, supra note 3, at 2036-42 (explaining why the regime complex
is only as strong as its weakest regime); Driesen, Free Lunch, supra note 43, at 65-68 (explaining
that polluter preferences to generate credits in the countries with the laxest rules will undermine
compliance in a multijurisdictional setting).
79. See David M. Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, The Functions of Transaction Costs:
Rethinking Transaction Cost Minimization in a World of Friction, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 61, 79-82
(2005) (discussing specific recommendations made commonly in the literature to reduce
transaction costs associated with emissions trading).
80. See id. at 107 (arguing that governments must impose sufficient transaction costs to
allow them to safeguard the environment from harm of bogus trades).
81. See id. at 92-98 (discussing how transaction costs generate enforceability and other
benefits).
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setting a cap. In other words, transaction costs deliver benefits.82 And
they only deserve elimination if the transaction costs seem unlikely to
83
deliver significant benefits.
Several experts have pointed out that a system where nation
states subsidize emission reductions abroad in addition to, rather than
in lieu of, a carbon reduction in a developed country might prove
84
more efficacious. The recent trend toward auctioning allowances
could create a pool of money that might make such a proposal more
feasible than it has been in the past, unless, of course, the current
economic crises either unwinds this trend or makes it impossible to
devote the funds to environmental protection.85
Two concerns support such a proposal. First, the already
discussed concerns about poor CDM performance counsel against
86
continuation of this approach. Second, transaction costs have
already become so high that little of the money being doled out for
87
credits pays for emission reduction. Hence, the CDM has proven a
very inefficient means of subsidizing environmental benefits and
88
technology transfer.
Evaluation of this proposal requires consideration of both
private and governmental transaction costs. Most scholars tend to
recommend reforms of the CDM designed to improve its
environmental performance, like the restriction of HFC credits
mentioned earlier. It requires a lot of legal experience to make good
judgments about whether such reforms can in fact produce largely
82. See id. at 110 (concluding that “transaction costs purchase corollary benefits”).
83. Id. at 103-04 (arguing that proposals to reduce or eliminate transaction costs need to
take the associated benefits into account).
84. See, e.g., Wara, supra note 26, at 1800-02; David G. Victor & Danny Cullenward,
Making Carbon Markets Work, SCI. AM., Dec. 2007, at 70, 76-77. Cf. Bluemel, Unraveling, supra
note 3, at 1986, 2045-48 (proposing the creation of a “Clean Development Fund” to allow
countries that “would otherwise be in noncompliance” to “fund emission-reducing projects”).
85. See Benito Müller, To Earmark or Not to Earmark?: A Far Reaching Debate on the Use
of Auction Revenue From (EU) Emissions Trading 4 (Oxford Inst. for Energy Studies, EV 43,
2008), available at http://www.oxfordclimatepolicy.org/publications/mueller.html; see, e.g., Mixed
Welcome for Latest US Cap-and-Trade Bill, CARBON FIN., Oct. 2008, at 10, 10 (stating that
Dingell-Boucher proposal requires auctioning of 100% of all allowances by 2026); Parliament
Plays It Tough, CARBON FIN., Oct. 2008, at 14, 14 (discussing European Parliaments support for
auctioning beginning in 2013 and rising to 100% of allowances by 2020).
86. See Wara, supra note 26, at 1797-98.
87. See Wara & Victor, supra note 30, at 11-12 (explaining that buyers of emission
reduction credits have paid €4.7 billion for industrial gas credits costing less than €100 million to
produce).
88. See Michael Wara, Is the Global Carbon Market Working?, 445 NATURE 595, 596
(2007) (describing the CDM as woefully inefficient).

DRIESEN_FMT2.DOC

2009]

4/27/2009 4:00:04 PM

LINKAGE AND MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE

407

game proof rules without caps. But if this is possible at all, it would be
accomplished by more rule proliferation, which would raise private
transaction costs further, thereby making the CDM an even more
inefficient mechanism for technology transfer. This proposal does
suggest a need for comparative analysis of the efficiencies of CDM
and direct subsidies.
A related question about governmental transaction costs arises:
Should governments invest a large percentage of the limited public
resources available to establish and enforce climate policies to the
linkage project? Such resources will not be available to expand the
scope of existing programs to protect the atmospheric commons.
Instead, they simply limit the losses of planned reductions that might
otherwise occur through broad environmental benefit trading. These
reductions could, of course, be realized through national or regional
trading programs or simply through caps without trades. The decision
to expand the scope of trading carries with it governmental
transactional costs that can limit the capacity of government to make
further progress on global warming.
The government transaction costs concern may help explain the
attractiveness of numerical limits on offset credits. While such limits
certainly reduce the opportunities for trading and associated private
sector cost savings, they do not involve terribly large transaction costs
for either private or public parties. By contrast, project-specific
review, if carried out properly, involves high transactions costs for
both governments and private parties. Indeed, poorly funded
regulatory bodies like those in the United States89 may be wholly
incapable of adequately monitoring a large credit flow, so that
quantitative restrictions may be essential to making qualitative checks
feasible.
D. Opportunity Cost Concerns: Can Trading Protect the Global
Commons Alone?
The opportunity costs involved in employing a trading design
that allows for high volume credit generation from uncapped sources
may be quite serious. Of course, if a trading regime by itself
adequately protected the global commons, it might make sense to
devote all of our resources to perfecting the trading regime. But it is

89. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000
U. ILL. L. REV. 185, 191 (2000) (describing state and federal environmental enforcement as
“woefully understaffed and underfunded”).
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highly unlikely that trading will succeed by itself in protecting the
global commons, although the caps set, if sufficiently stringent, can
make a meaningful contribution.
Global trading’s primary value lies in its ability to seek out the
lowest cost reductions anywhere in the world. For that reason, it does
little to spur valuable investments that may be needed to address
90
global warming. The primary example of this problem may be
nuclear power. France has very low utility sector emissions because
its government has supported nuclear power and carefully supervised
nuclear projects to try to address public concerns about safety and
waste disposal. It is extraordinarily unlikely that a trading program
would stimulate any nuclear power, even if the trading rules allowed
it (current EU rules disallow it).91
There is a tradeoff between maximizing cost reduction and
maximizing technological development likely to significantly increase
92
global capacity to address global warming. Some technologies, such
as experimental installation of advanced solar technologies, may
generate positive spillover effects, such as increasing the efficiency of
solar cells to make them more useful in the future and generating
local air pollution benefits.93 Advanced technologies with positive
spillover effects may prove valuable in increasing our long term
94
capacity to address climate change. But valuable technologies will
often prove expensive, and trading favors the least cost reduction

90. See David M. Driesen, Does Emissions Trading Encourage Innovation?, 33 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10094, 10094-105 (2003) (discussing environmental innovation’s value generally and
empirical and theoretical evidence of innovation in trading programs); Driesen, Free Lunch,
supra note 43, at 41-55 (explaining trading’s weaknesses in encouraging innovation and why this
matters to the future of the climate regime); Driesen, Sustainable Development, supra note 47,
at 41-55 (explaining emissions trading does not well support the most valuable innovations,
which tend to be relatively expensive).
91. See Linking Directive, supra note 24, art. 11a(3)(a).
92. See David M. Driesen, Design, Trading, and Innovation, in MOVING TO MARKETS IN
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LESSONS FROM TWENTY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE 436 (Jody
Freeman & Charles D. Kolstad eds., 2007) (discussing trading’s limits as a promoter of
innovation along with design issues relevant to innovation); Driesen, Sustainable Development,
supra note 47, at 51-59 (explaining the reasons for the tradeoff); David A. Malueg, Emission
Credit Trading and the Incentive to Adopt New Pollution Abatement Technology, 16 J. ENVTL.
ECON. & MGMT. 52, 52-53 (1989) (explaining that trading reduces incentives for credit buyers to
innovate, while increasing sellers’ incentives to adopt cheap innovation).
93. See Driesen, Sustainable Development, supra note 47, at 48-49 (describing solar power’s
positive spillovers as an example of spillovers critical to long-term efforts to address global
warming).
94. Id. at 48 (explaining how innovation in renewable energy can increase our ability to
phase out fossil fuels).
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regardless of positive spillover effects.95 Initially expensive
technologies, such as substantially all renewables, have experienced
declining costs when makers have opportunities to experience
“learning by doing” and will continue to do so in the future if
96
sufficiently encouraged. Accordingly, governments that have made
serious technological advances that increase our capacity to address
global warming have generally not accomplished this through broad
environmental benefit trading, but from a variety of programs that
have technological advancement as a primary aim.97 Examples include
feed-in tariffs supporting renewable energy, renewable portfolio
98
standards, and Brazil’s program to promote biofuels.
In other words, picking low hanging fruit is a good thing. But if
we expect to need to pluck substantially all of the fruit from the tree,
we may need to invest some funds early on in ladder construction.
While well-designed trading programs can certainly contribute to
protection of the global commons, some programs aimed more
squarely at technological advancement through encouragement of
99
deployment of advanced technology may be needed.
While the high volume of capital flowing into the CDM program
to purchase reductions substituting for already planned for reductions
in Europe excites analysts, other capital flows may be more important
to global warming policy. For example, the World Bank continues to
fund fossil fuel projects in developing countries and many developed
countries continue to subsidize their own fossil fuel industries. These
capital flows dwarf the flows into the CDM and drive emissions

95. Id. at 52 (explaining that trading favors least cost abatement over maximization of
positive spillovers).
96. See David M. Driesen, Renewable Energy Under the Kyoto Protocol: The Case for
Mixing Instruments, in A GLOBALLY INTEGRATED CLIMATE POLICY FOR CANADA 203, 205
(Steven Bernstein et al. eds., 2008).
97. See Driesen, Sustainable Development, supra note 47, at 37-39, 42-44 (discussing
specific programs and their general results).
98. See id. at 37-38 (discussing feed-in tariffs and renewable portfolio standards); Juscelino
F. Colares, A Brief History of Brazilian Biofuels Legislation, 35 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM.
293 (2008); Haroldo Machado-Filho, Climate Change and the International Trade of Biofuels, 2
CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 67, 70-71 (2008); Marc Ringel, Fostering the Use of Renewable
Energies in the European Union: The Race Between Feed-in Tariffs and Green Certificates, 31
RENEWABLE ENERGY 1, 3-5 (2006) (discussing the policy aims of EU renewable energy
programs).
99. See Driesen, Sustainable Development, supra note 47, at 59 (suggesting the need for
targeting polices at the innovation goal, rather than just assuming that innovation emerges as a
byproduct of any efficient market mechanism).
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upwards.100 Eliminating such perverse subsidies will require the time
and attention of policymakers.
Even within trading programs themselves, it is not clear that
using tons of resources to broaden the programs as much as possible
constitutes the wisest investment of scarce government resources. For
example, regulators in the RGGI region have been concerned that
caps on electric utility emissions could lead to increases in electricity
prices that could hurt consumers and make future progress politically
difficult. Accordingly, RGGI states plan to invest some of the
101
proceeds from allowance sales in funding end-use energy efficiency.
Energy efficiency improvements can enable consumers to avoid cost
increases in their total bill, even if per kilowatt hour charges
102
increase. Of course, implementing these programs properly will
require substantial investment of government resources to design and
operate the programs. These local uses of resources probably have
much more capacity to make programs successful than efforts to
broaden the programs through linkage.103
Because government regulators have significant alternative
investments available to them for addressing climate change, devoting
large amounts of scarce government regulatory resources to
accommodating the kinds of trades that government has never
successfully monitored in the past does impose an opportunity cost on
the public. These costs probably merit analysts’ attention.
Furthermore, a world of multiple regimes with trading between them
provides opportunities for private actors to game the system by

100. Axel Michaelowa, At the Crossroads, CARBON FIN., Mar. 2008, at 14, 14 (2008) (citing
$1 billion in traded CDM credits in 2007); Christopher Swann, World Bank Increases Fossil Fuel
Funding Despite Pledge, PITTSBURGH TRIB. REV., Aug. 24, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR
16004007 (reporting World Bank funding of $2.3 billion annually for fossil fuel related
undertakings).
101. See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, http://www.rggi.org/about (last visited Mar.
25, 2009) (noting that RGGI “us[es] the proceeds of allowance auctions to support . . . energy
efficiency and clean renewable energy”); MOU, supra note 32, § 2(G)(1).
102. See Maxine Burkett, Just Solutions to Climate Change: A Climate Justice Proposal for a
Domestic Clean Development Mechanism, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 169, 217 n.189 (2008) (explaining
that “[t]he proceeds from the sales” under RGGI will help spare consumers from the costs of
“potential rate hikes”).
103. Political economy considerations may appear to justify broad offset programs, because
cheap credits may enable regulators to set more stringent caps. Cf. Driesen, Sustainable
Development, supra note 47, at 62 (explaining that in principle cheaper regulation allows for
stricter caps). But there is some doubt about the role of anticipated cost savings in setting caps,
see id. at 62-64 (discussing reasons for this), and an ostensibly stricter cap based on offsets may
prove ephemeral.
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generating credits in the countries with the laxest oversight.104
Simplification through concrete limits on linkage, especially with
respect to offsets, may prove better for the environment and for
market stability than wide open linked systems.
CONCLUSION
A global property rights regime requires enforcement and
involves multiple levels of government. While capping carbon can
contribute to the effort to address global warming, globalizing trading
poses challenges that can undermine the effort. Governments would
be wise to focus less on linking up disparate markets in carbon
reduction and more on establishing a variety of approaches that
maximize emission reductions and innovation.

104. See Bluemel, Unraveling, supra note 3, at 2036-42 (explaining why the “regime complex
is . . . only as strong as its weakest regime”); Driesen, Free Lunch, supra note 43, at 65-68
(explaining that polluter preferences to generate credits in the countries with the laxest rules
will undermine compliance in a multijurisdictional setting); Sam Headon, Offsets in the
International Emissions Market: Do Buyers Get What They Pay For?, 4 CARBON & CLIMATE L.
REV. 406, 415 (2008) (finding that the top 50 buyers in the CDM market are prioritizing cost
effectiveness over environmental integrity and transparency).

